

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

MEMORANDUM TO: Deputy Director for Intelligence

MEMORANDUM SUBJECT: Briefing Memorandum on "Report of the IAC: Ad Hoc Guided Missile Intelligence Survey Committee"

1. The following are the major points on which the Survey Committee agreed:

- a. The state of our knowledge in guided missile intelligence is still inadequate, primarily because of insufficient collection of data (but the Department of Defense members disagreed with summarizing this statement under Section IV, Discussion).
- b. Present collection efforts, overt and covert, are inadequate to satisfy the community's requirements, even though collection has improved in the past 12 to 18 months, with some of the new methods showing considerable promise.
- c. Collection and production have been impaired due to lack of understanding and/or effective working relationships between collectors and consumers (prime example: the difficulty between NSA and the Air Force).
- d. There are deficiencies in the coordination of intelligence activities and lateral flow of information (but the Committee could not agree as to the remedy for these situations).

2. Majority views and opinions were obtained as follows (CIA views indicated):

- a. Each agency should examine its guided missile intelligence program to determine that it, within the allocation of resources available, reflects the priority accorded this field. State, SEC, and CIA agree, but believe this examination should be made within the light of the activity's responsibility and under guidance of a Guided Missile Intelligence Committee (GMC).⁷

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APPENDIX: Including Memorandum on "Report of the IAC Ad Hoc Guided Missile Intelligence Survey Committee"

b. The Department of Defense and CIA are duplicating their efforts in the area of operational characteristics of guided missiles, and CIA should produce intelligence only in the field of basic science. (Air Force abstained; State, ADC, and CIA opposed on the grounds of critical importance to national security.)

c. Existing mechanisms are adequate to effect coordination. (State, ADC, and CIA opposed and favor the establishment of ODC.)

(1) Requirements have been adequately formulated, coordinated, and passed on to the collectors. (State, ADC, and CIA opposed.)

(2) All phases of research, analysis, and production are satisfactorily coordinated, both within each activity and within the community. (State, ADC, and CIA opposed on the grounds that coordination now is much too informal considering the large number of activities involved.)

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d. There exists a problem with respect to determining the most efficient and effective means of correlating pertinent electronic intelligence (communications and non-communications) with other information in the production of guided missile intelligence. (The Committee agreed this was a problem area, but disagreed on identical wording and recommendation for corrective action. CIA tried to follow a middle course and agreed with the majority.)

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Guided Missile Intelligence Survey Committee"**

3. The basic differences in the Committee Report appear to center on the following three questions:
- a. In the field of scientific and technical intelligence, shall CIA engage in research, analysis, and production of intelligence on guided missile hardware items, or confine its activities to basic science? (State, AFSC, and CIA members recommend full partnership.)
 - b. Shall GMIC be established for the purpose of strengthening the over-all government intelligence structure and to improve scientific and technical and economic intelligence in a field critical to national security? (State, AFSC, and CIA members recommend establishment of GMIC.)
 - c. Who shall assume the problem of determining the most efficient and effective means of correlating pertinent electronic intelligence (communications and non-communications) with other information in the production of guided missile intelligence so as to satisfy not only the IAC agencies but also NSA? (CIA member agreed with majority that this is properly a responsibility of the Secretary of Defense.)
4. Determination of answers to these questions appear to be the primary task before the IAC. This Office endorses the position taken by the CIA member on the Survey Committee and recommends your strongest support in obtaining appropriate action on the aforementioned questions. This Office further recommends your strong support of the other recommendations in the Report endorsed by State, AFSC, and CIA. This Office, however, believes that NSA should not have a full membership on GMIC, inasmuch as this Agency is not a member of the IAC community.
5. Recommended points to be stressed include:
- a. The critical importance to national security of guided missile intelligence because of the estimated ICBM threat and the great difficulties of countering this threat.

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- b. The importance to national policy of guided missile intelligence because of the threat of the intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM) on the U. S., our European allies, and on our retaliatory bases in these areas.
 - c. The continued deficiency of hard facts in this field and the necessity for obtaining as close a working relationship as is practicable.
 - d. The lack of intent of CIA to pre-empt this field, but rather, with other IAC agencies, to join as full-fledged members.
 - e. That establishment of GSC will not act to subordinate the recognized responsibilities of the military departments.
 - f. That the community should make every effort to efficiently and effectively utilize intelligence information once collected.
- b. Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that:
- a. In opening discussion on this item, you mention the areas of basic differences and stress the points covered in paragraph 3, above.
 - b. Ask for comment on the Report by the IAC members.
 - c. If, in the discussion, it develops that some type of GSC may be acceptable, but a change in the wording of the Directive is indicated, introduce the revised Terms of Reference, attached hereto as Tab A, and propose these Terms be issued as an Annex to DOD 3/4. (Note: The AD/IR believes the Directive establishing GSC should not be tied to DOD 3/4.)
 - d. If GSC is sought, changes to DOD 3/4 should be discussed per Tab B.
 - e. If the IAC splits as did the Survey Committee, submit your intention of carrying this matter to the National Security Council for decision.

JOHN G. SCOTT, JR.
Assistant Director
Scientific Intelligence

Attachment: 2
Table A & B

REF ID: A65770
[REDACTED] Detaching [REDACTED] on Report of the IAC to the
[REDACTED] United Nations Intelligence Survey Committee

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